University of Wisconsin Milwaukee

UWM Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations

August 2016

Locutionary Disablement and Epistemic Injustice
Dana Elizabeth Grabelsky
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd
Part of the Epistemology Commons
Recommended Citation
Grabelsky, Dana Elizabeth, "Locutionary Disablement and Epistemic Injustice" (2016). Theses and Dissertations. 1370.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/1370

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu.

LOCUTIONARY DISABLEMENT AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE
by
Dana Grabelsky

A Thesis Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts
in Philosophy

at
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
August 2016

i

ABSTRACT
LOCUTIONARY DISABLEMENT AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE
by
Dana Grabelsky
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Under the Supervision of Professor Andrea Westlund and Professor Edward Hinchman

In this paper, I investigate how the notion of epistemic injustice relates to two distinct,
though not incompatible, models of the phenomenon of silencing: epistemic and linguistic. I
argue that a linguistic model of silencing can be used to elucidate the nature of hermeneutical
injustice—a type of epistemic injustice identified by Miranda Fricker. I put forth my own
reformulation of the linguistic model of silencing as locutionary (as opposed to illocutionary)
disablement, when it occurs in cases of hermeneutical injustice, and I argue that this
reformulation can respond to the criticism that Fricker’s construal of hermeneutical injustice falls
prey to charges of epistemic hegemony. I conclude by suggesting that this form of silencing,
which has its origins in a history of political domination and dehumanization, is connected to a
third, distinctive form of epistemic injustice (beyond testimonial and hermeneutical injustice),
which concerns the unfair distribution of the burdens of communication between members of
differently situated social groups.
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Introduction
Rachel Jeantel, a young black woman, served as a key prosecution witness in the 2013
trial of George Zimmerman for the murder of Trayvon Martin. A friend of Martin, Jeantel was
on the phone with Martin when the altercation with Zimmerman began, so her testimony was to
be especially illuminating in providing evidence of how the events unfolded. However, once she
took the stand, communicative dysfunction ensued; and in the media and larger public
conversation, Jeantel was attacked and ridiculed for her supposedly “incomprehensible”
testimony. But as some linguists, such as John Rickford (2014) and John McWhorter (2013),
point out, Jeantel was, in fact, speaking a perfectly comprehensible dialect of English, African
American Vernacular English (AAVE, or Ebonics), and the ridicule leveled against Jeantel was
undeniably racist and sexist in nature. As Brittney Cooper (2013) explains:
The unique quality of her black vernacular speaking style became hypervisible
against the backdrop of powerful white men fluently deploying corporate, proper
English in ways that she could not do. The way they spoke to her was designed
not only to discredit her, but to condescend to and humiliate her.
Because of these racist and sexist judgments regarding Jeantel’s speech and demeanor, her
attempt to share important knowledge via her testimony was seriously and wrongly impeded; as
such, she seems to have suffered from what Miranda Fricker (2007) would call an epistemic
injustice.
In this paper, I investigate how this notion of epistemic injustice relates to two distinct,
though not incompatible, models of the phenomenon of silencing: epistemic and linguistic.
While Fricker follows an epistemic model of silencing and locates it within the context of the
first type of epistemic injustice that she describes—testimonial injustice—I argue that a linguistic
model of silencing can be used to elucidate the nature of the second type of epistemic injustice—
hermeneutical injustice. I begin in section 1 by providing an overview of both the epistemic and
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linguistic models of silencing. Then, in section 2, I argue that a reformulation of the linguistic
model of silencing as locutionary (as opposed to illocutionary) disablement can help respond to
the criticism that Fricker’s construal of hermeneutical injustice falls prey to charges of epistemic
hegemony, and I put forth my own reformulation of silencing as locutionary disablement (three
types, corresponding to Austin’s three distinctions among locutionary acts) as it occurs in cases
of hermeneutical injustice. Lastly, in section 3, I suggest that this form of silencing is connected
to a third, distinctive form of epistemic injustice (beyond testimonial and hermeneutical
injustice), which concerns the unfair distribution of the burdens of communication between
members of differently situated social groups. I call this third type of epistemic injustice the
epistemic injustice of interpretive burden. I claim that this injustice arises due to a particular
history of political domination—that of White supremacy, as articulated by Charles Mills in The
Racial Contract—and the deliberate dehumanization and devaluation of marginalized groups and
their linguistic practices, and willful epistemic ignorance on the part of the dominant group.
Because of the structural nature of this sort of oppression I explain how it can occur even
in circumstances in which theorizers and activists are attempting to ameliorate the former two
types of epistemic injustice. The epistemic injustice of interpretive burden is particularly
prevalent in the case of White-dominated feminist theory. When their voices are not outright
silenced in this domain, women of color are often expected to take on the responsibility of
bridging the interpretive gap—due to either language barriers or divergent life experiences (or
both)—between their White interlocutors and themselves. This particular form of epistemic
injustice must also be addressed and resolved, if those who claim to be committed to dismantling
historically unjust power structures wish to succeed in their social justice-oriented efforts.

2

1. Testimonial Injustice and Two Models of Silencing
1.1 Overview of Testimonial Injustice
In Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007), Miranda Fricker offers
an account of two types of injustice that are distinctly epistemic in nature: testimonial injustice
and hermeneutical injustice. These injustices are epistemic because they harm an individual in
her capacity as a knower. But they are also inextricably linked to ethical injustices arising from
systematic imbalances in social and political power. Fricker argues that because these epistemic
injustices arise from such imbalances in social and political power, in order to confront and
ultimately mitigate the effects of such injustices, we must consider the socially and politically
situated contexts in which they occur.
As noted above, the first of these two types of epistemic injustice is testimonial injustice.
Fricker argues that testimonial injustice is perpetrated by a hearer against a speaker, when the
hearer’s credibility judgment of the speaker is diminished due to prejudicial stereotypes
associated with the speaker’s social type. This is both a distinctly epistemic injustice—in that it
harms the speaker in her capacity as a knower—and an ethical injustice—in that the prejudicial
stereotypes upon which the diminished credibility judgment is formed are the result of an
imbalance of social power. When a speaker’s credibility is diminished, this leads to a demotion
in the speaker’s epistemic status from “informant to source of information, from subject to
object” (Fricker 2007:133). Drawing on Edward Craig’s State of Nature story (1990), Fricker
explains that one’s status as an informant, as opposed to a mere source of information, is
significant in that distinguishing among good and bad informants is essential to our epistemic
practices and to our very concept of knowledge. When a speaker is perceived as not credible as
an informant, she is excluded from participating in the exchange and production of knowledge
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that occurs amongst “the community of informants” (2007:130). Her testimony might be taken as
evidence of some kind, but it is the sort of evidence that might equally have been given by an
object—for instance, a thermometer might be a source of information regarding the temperature,
but because it is an object, it is a mere source of information rather than an informant. When a
speaker’s testimony is taken as evidence in this way (that is, as coming from a mere source of
information), she is epistemically objectified.
Thus Fricker identifies the intrinsic harm of testimonial injustice in the epistemic
objectification of the speaker. When a speaker is objectified in this way, her words no longer
count as testimony coming from a knower; instead, she is treated as a mere source of
information. However, it is important to note that objectification per se is not necessarily
harmful—it constitutes an epistemic harm only when the reason for objectifying a speaker stems
from prejudicial stereotypes about the speaker’s social types.1 Such stereotypes arise in the
context of systematic ethical injustice, and therefore, their deployment in judging a speaker’s
epistemic status is also unjust.
1.2 Sexual Objectification and the Epistemic Model of Silencing
Fricker describes the link between the harm of epistemic objectification and the harm of
sexual objectification, writing:
[O]ur main interest in the connection between sexual and epistemic objectification
lies not in the general idea that they might be causally related via a common
prejudice, but more specifically in the possibility that a climate of sexual
objectification might give rise to cases of testimonial injustice so extreme that the
epistemic injustice crosses over into a fundamental communicative dysfunction.
(2007:139)

1

A case in which epistemic objectification would not constitute a harm: a tired and hungry young child is acting out
and yells at his mother, “I hate you, Mommy!” His mother knows he acts this way when he is tired and hungry, so
she does not treat his words as conveying his true meaning as a knowing agent; she treats him instead as a source of
information—that information being, “My child is tired and hungry.”
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This “fundamental communicative dysfunction” leads to a phenomenon known as silencing.
Silencing occurs when a speaker’s credibility is diminished so severely—prior to even offering
any piece of testimony—that when she does speak, “her utterance simply fails to register with
[the hearer’s] testimonial sensibility” (2007:140). That is, the hearer does not recognize the
speaker as even being able to offer any sort of testimony—the speaker is totally objectified in
these cases.
Fricker notes another account of silencing, offered by Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby,
who frame this phenomenon in the context of philosophy of language (particularly the speech act
theory of J.L. Austin), rather than epistemology. Specifically, Langton and Hornsby focus on the
importance of the communicative relationship between speaker and hearer, which is in some way
undermined when silencing occurs. Curiously, however, Fricker quickly seems to reject their
linguistic model of silencing in favor of the epistemic model because, as she claims, “[the
epistemic model] requires less erosion of women’s human status before the silencing effect kicks
in” (2007:142). I find Fricker’s dismissal of the linguistic model curious because, 1) like José
Medina (2012), I do not immediately see how the two models are inherently incompatible with
one another, and more importantly, 2) the linguistic model’s emphasis on the communicative and
reciprocal nature of speech acts can be used to address a particular criticism of Fricker’s account
of the second type of epistemic injustice: hermeneutical injustice. However, before addressing
this criticism, I must first offer a brief account of the linguistic model of silencing.
1.3 The Linguistic Model of Silencing
In “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts” (1993), Rae Langton takes up the concerns of
feminist theorists regarding the silencing effect that pornography has on women.2 She places this
issue in the context of speech act theory, whereby an utterance constitutes a particular kind of
2

Notable among feminist theorists on this topic is Catharine MacKinnon.
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action. This notion of speech acts applies to pornography in that Langton characterizes
pornography as both a kind of speech and a kind of act—and thus: a speech act. She writes
succinctly in the opening paragraph:
Pornography is speech. So the courts declared in judging it protected by the First
Amendment. Pornography is a kind of act. So Catharine MacKinnon declared in
arguing for laws against it. Put these together and we have: pornography is a kind
of speech act. (Langton 1993:293)
This prompts the question, then: what kind of speech act is pornography and how does it
contribute to the silencing of women? To answer this question, Langton appeals to J.L. Austin’s
distinctions between three different types of speech acts: locution (i.e., the content of an
utterance), illocution (i.e., the action constituted by the utterance), and perlocution (i.e., the effect
of the utterance) (Langton 1993:295). Using this terminology, Langton argues that not only does
pornography depict and consequently perpetuate the subordination of women, but it itself
performs the illocutionary act of subordinating women—thus, she characterizes silencing as
illocutionary disablement. According to Langton, pornography silences women—via
illocutionary disablement—because it has the authority to issue certain illocutionary demands—
that is, “rank[ing] women as sex objects [and] legitimat[ing] sexual violence” (Langton
1993:307). Similarly, those in other positions of power may have the authority to issue
subordinating speech acts. For instance, Langton points to the utterance, “Blacks are not
permitted to vote” (1993:302). When uttered by a legislator in Apartheid-era South Africa, this
speech act has an illocutionary force, which serves to subordinate blacks—thus “a speech act
[can] be an illocutionary act of subordination” (1993:302).
So, presupposing that pornography (or perhaps more generally, the patriarchal societal
structure out of which it has developed) does in fact have the authority perform this illocutionary

6

act of subordination, it leads to the illocutionary disablement of women.3 This is because the
power differential between speakers and hearers in this context is so unequal, women as
speakers—having been subordinated and objectified—are not even in enough of a position of
authority to be able to perform certain very important illocutionary acts. The communicative
relation between speaker and hearer has been undermined so severely, the hearer does not (or
even cannot) properly take up what the speaker has done in saying something. Paradigmatically,
the illocutionary speech act of refusal that a woman performs in uttering the locution “No” in
response to an unwanted sexual advance is not properly taken up by the hearer. In contrast with
pornography’s authority to illocutionarily subordinate women, it is the woman’s lack of authority
to refuse sexual advances, in this case, that prevents her “No” from being taken up as a genuine
act of refusal—thus, her illocution has been silenced.

2. Silencing as Locutionary Disablement in Hermeneutical Injustice
2.1 Overview of Hermeneutical Injustice
With both the epistemic and linguistic models of silencing in mind now, I will explain
how silencing might occur in cases of the second type of epistemic injustice that Fricker
describes: hermeneutical injustice. Though Fricker explains silencing only within the context of
testimonial injustice, I propose that silencing can occur in cases of hermeneutical injustice as
well, and it is in these cases that the linguistic model of silencing can help address the criticism
that Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice is guilty of a certain epistemic hegemony. First,
3

Whether or not pornography itself has the sort of authority that Langton and those like MacKinnon claim it does is
a source of considerable debate. I am inclined to think that it is not pornography alone that issues such subordinating
demands, but rather the larger cultural framework that eroticizes the objectification and subordination of women;
that is, pornography is just one of many institutions that derives its authority to issue such illocutions from the
authoritative patriarchal structure of society. Though this debate is itself worthy of investigation, for my purposes, I
am concerned primarily with the second part of Langton’s paper, which focuses more specifically on the
phenomenon of silencing in women—in particular, their failure to perform certain illocutionary acts—rather than the
power of pornography to silence.
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however, a brief overview of Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice is required. Fricker
writes: “Hermeneutical injustice is: the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social
experience obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the
collective hermeneutical resource” (Fricker 2007:155).
To illustrate a paradigmatic case of hermeneutical injustice, Fricker points to the
phenomenon of “sexual harassment.” She explains in the case of the phenomenon of sexual
harassment: prior to the introduction of the term “sexual harassment,” women who experienced
what we now call sexual harassment suffered a hermeneutical injustice. They suffered such an
injustice because they were unable to make sense of and articulate what it was they were
experiencing at the hands of men and other superiors in the workplace. For women, this definite,
but yet unnamed, experience was so unintelligible and inarticulable even to themselves, that this
frustration often manifested itself in both psychological and physical symptoms. Once women
began the practice of consciousness raising, acknowledging that something was happening to
them, but prior to actually having the term “sexual harassment” at their disposal to describe their
experience of it, it was the case that: “‘[t]he ‘this’ they were going to break the silence about had
no name.’ […] Here is a story about how extant collective hermeneutical resources can have a
lacuna where the name of a distinctive social experience should be” (Fricker 2007:150).4 In other
words, I suggest, women lacked the meaningful locution—“sexual harassment”—to
communicate their experience. In this sense, then, I propose that hermeneutical injustice can
result in silencing in the form of locutionary disablement, as opposed to just illocutionary
disablement.

4

Brownmiller in In Our Time, 280-281, as quoted by Fricker.
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2.2 Locutionary Disablement
Remember that, “[t]o perform a locutionary act is to utter a sentence that has a particular
meaning, as traditionally conceived” (Langton 1993:295). When an individual is excluded from
the hermeneutical framework determined by the dominant cultural power, she may lack even the
ability to perform the locutionary act of expressing her thoughts intelligibly. Langton addresses
the possibility of what I am now calling locutionary disablement when considering which type of
speech act (i.e., locution, illocution, or perlocution) is in play when silencing occurs. She writes:
At the first and most basic level, members of a powerless group may be silent
because they are intimidated, or because they believe that no one will listen. They
do not protest at all, because they fear the guns. In such cases, no words are
uttered at all. In Austin’s terms, speakers fail to perform even a locutionary act.
(1993:315)
It is not necessarily the case that a member of a marginalized group is literally (i.e., physically)
prevented from speaking, but in any case, they are silenced in the sense that their political
circumstances render them unable to communicate because the cost of speaking is too high. The
problem is not only that the proper uptake has not been secured, in that the action performed in a
particular illocution has misfired (for instance, an act of refusal in the utterance of “no” is taken
as an act of consent). Rather, in the cases to which Langton refers, the marginalized member is
prevented from speaking at all.
Being prevented from speaking or lacking a particular locution, however, are just two
ways in which one can be locutionarily disabled. I suggest that another way of being
locutionarily disabled is to be excluded from participating in a shared language or conceptual
framework (i.e., Fricker’s “collective hermeneutical resource”).5 If I am correct in arguing that
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Throughout the remainder of this paper, I will use such terms as “linguistic framework,”
“conceptual framework,” and “hermeneutical framework” roughly interchangeably to describe
the frameworks under which one articulates their concepts and experiences through language.
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locutionary disablement can and does occur (in addition to illocutionary disablement), then it is
reasonable to suggest that there may also be different types of locutionary disablement, given
that Austin identifies three distinctions among locutionary acts. Summarizing this account of
locutionary acts, Austin writes:
We […] made three rough distinctions between the phonetic act, the phatic act,
and the rhetic act. The phonetic act is merely the act of uttering certain noises.
The phatic act is the uttering of certain vocables and words, i.e. noises of certain
types, belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary, conforming to and
as conforming to a certain grammar. The rhetic act is the performance of an act
using those vocables with a certain more-or-less definite sense and reference.
(Austin 1962:95)
Like illocutionary acts, Austin argues, locutionary acts are subject to failure—but they are
subject to failure in an importantly different way: “failures [of locutionary acts] will not be
unhappinesses as [in illocutionary acts], but rather failures to get the words out, to express
ourselves clearly, etc.” (1962:106). “Failures to get the words out,” then, might be characterized
as a failure of phonetic acts, while failures “to express ourselves clearly” might be characterized
as a failure of either phatic acts or rhetic acts. Such failures seem to accurately describe the
various cases of locutionary disablement I consider throughout this paper. In the case of being
prevented from speaking or lacking a particular locution, one is locutionarily disabled—but in
particular, one is phonetically disabled, because she fails to perform “the act of uttering certain
noises.” This is just what occurred in the case of sexual harassment, when women did not even
have the words to articulate what they were experiencing. Not having the words can have
significant ramifications, particularly in cases in which being able to articulate one’s complaint
can determine one’s legal options: you cannot sue for sexual harassment unless the term “sexual
harassment” exists in the first place. So in the case of sexual harassment, the hermeneutical

10

injustice that women suffered was characterized by phonetic disablement. However, as I will
argue in relation to Rachel Jeantel’s case, one can also be phatically disabled.6
2.3 Jeantel, revisited
Let’s return now to the opening case of Rachel Jeantel. Clearly, Jeantel suffered a
testimonial injustice, similar to the (fictional) example of Tom Robinson from To Kill A
Mockingbird that Fricker utilizes to illustrate testimonial injustice. In Fricker’s often used
example, she explains that Tom Robinson’s testimony is deemed not credible by a jury of whites
as a result of systematic prejudice towards blacks. In the case of Rachel Jeantel, however, I want
to argue, that she was also a victim of hermeneutical injustice, given the emphasis not just what
she said, but the way in which she spoke in her testimony: besides the blatantly racist ridicule
leveled against her appearance and demeanor, Jeantel’s use of language was harshly criticized as
well. Perhaps given that her first language was Haitian Creole, and not English, confusion
regarding her speech was partly understandable. However, this was not simply a case of
language barriers, because had she spoken an entirely different language than English in her
testimony, as opposed to a dialect, she would have been given a translator:
Since one cannot restrict witnesses to those who speak fluent standard English
[…] it is up to jurors and the court to make greater efforts to understand them.
The problem is exacerbated for speakers of English dialects, who do not get
access to translators as witnesses from foreign language backgrounds do.
(Rickford 2014)
So while it is perfectly understandable that we might often encounter problems regarding
language translation in our globalized society, that more effort was not made to understand
Jeantel’s English dialect in an American courtroom shows that systematic prejudice was
certainly at play. Jeantel’s use of AAVE was likely disregarded because it represented a
6

While, presumably, one may also be rhetically disabled, I will not explore that possibility in depth here. The
accounts of phonetic and phatic disablement will, I think, suffice for illustrating that there are at least two different
ways in which one might be locutionarily disabled.
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deviation from standard (that is, “superior”) English: “As is often the case, particularly in formal
settings, unfamiliarity with and negative attitudes toward vernacular speech rendered Jeantel
simply ignorant in the eyes of the jury – and therefore not a credible witness” (Rickford 2014).
That Jeantel’s credibility as a witness (as relates to testimony) was inextricably bound up with
negative attitudes towards her speech (as relates to the cultural hermeneutical framework),
suggests that she was a victim of both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, as construed by
Fricker.
Given that we are socially situated beings, the feelings and experiences that we are able
to express are made expressible and intelligible through hermeneutical frameworks that provide
us with language and concepts. But since not all of us actually share these same frameworks—as
we have just seen in the case of Rachel Jeantel—communication across different frameworks can
be impeded when no attempts are made to bridge the interpretive gap between the frameworks.
This usually occurs when one framework is seen by the politically dominant group as inferior to
their own (for instance, English dialects seen as inferior to “standard” English). Fricker herself
notes that it is not just a matter of having a specific phrase (i.e. locution) such as “sexual
harassment” to articulate one’s experience that is necessary in order to avoid hermeneutical
injustice. In addition to having a particular locution at one’s disposal, one must also have access
to the entire conceptual and linguistic framework in order to make one’s experience
intelligible—perhaps to themselves and certainly to others—within a society:
[W]e must recognize that a hermeneutical gap might equally concern not (or not
only) the content but rather the form of what can be said. Thus the characteristic
expressive style of a given social group may be rendered just as much of an unfair
hindrance to their communicative efforts as interpretive absence can be.
(2007:160)

12

But which expressive styles count as intelligible within a collective hermeneutical framework?
The answer to this question exposes an unintended and problematic aspect of Fricker’s account
that apparently ignores the significance of non-dominant hermeneutical frameworks for selfunderstanding by members of marginalized groups, and betrays her own commitment to
challenging epistemic hegemony.
In addressing this apparent blind spot in Fricker’s account, I claim that the nature of the
hermeneutical injustice perpetrated against Jeantel extends beyond the form of hermeneutical
injustice that Fricker articulates. Specifically, I argue that the hermeneutical injustice that Jeantel
suffered includes the specific form of locutionary disablement (in particular phatic disablement).
Further, my account allows us to maintain that Jeantel was both locutionarily and illocutionarily
disabled since, as Austin (1962:147) claims, there is generally a great deal of overlap between
locutionary and illocutionary acts, therefore my account of silencing is compatible with Langton
and Hornsby’s account. However, by looking at the case of Rachel Jeantel specifically as a case
of locutionary disablement, the way in which the reciprocal communicative relation between
speaker and hearer was undermined becomes even more striking. There is not even a possibility
of proper uptake, when the hearer does not even understand the locution. It is no surprise that
Jeantel was illocuationary disabled (in that what she was trying to do in saying something (her
illocutionary act) was unsuccessful, given that the content of what she was trying to say did not
rise to the level of successful locution. In the eyes (or rather, ears) of her interlocutors, Jeantel’s
testimony failed the phatic level. Jeantel was phatically disabled because although she spoke
words that were mostly recognizable as English, her grammatical constructions were not (they
were the grammatical constructions of AAVE). However, one might think it unfair to suggest
that Jeantel was phatically disabled, given that she was able to peform phatic acts within the
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context of her own dialect. But somehow, she still did not succeed in communicating, suggesting
that her phatic acts were less than fully successful. This, I think, demonstrates the
communicative nature of language described by Jennifer Hornsby.
Hornsby argues that any philosophical account of language must include the fact that it is
fundamentally communicative, and thus the hearer is just as essential as the speaker. As she
explains:
Philosophers who think in isolation about language make an assumption about the
self-sufficiency of the individual language user. […] The philosopher who thinks
about language in abstraction from use forgets about its function: he forgets what
sentences are for. Sentences of course are for communicating with. Thus we make
the function of language evident if we accord a central role to saying something to
another in the explication of linguistic meaning. (2000:8)
Jeantel’s experience may very well have been obscured from the “collective”
understanding of the dominant groups (i.e., White men) in the courtroom, but it was not obscured
from her own understanding. She spoke in, and had full command of, the dialect in which she
was raised. That the public responded with such outrage and confusion demonstrates ignorance
on their part, not on Jeantel’s part. This suggests that Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice
is inadequate in accounting for all of the consequences of being excluded from a hermeneutical
framework.
2.4 Criticism of Fricker’s Hermeneutical Injustice
It is problematic to suggest that by virtue of being excluded from the dominant
hermeneutical framework, Jeantel was “prevent[ed] from understanding a significant area of her
social experience, thus depriving her of an important patch of self-understanding” (Fricker
2007:149). Jeantel, in fact, had a hermeneutical framework through which she could articulate
her experience, but it was not recognized as intelligible by those operating within the politically
and culturally dominant (i.e., White) hermeneutical framework. Contrary to Fricker’s account
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then, just because a marginalized group speaks a less dominant dialect of a language, this does
not mean that they are necessarily always victims of hermeneutical injustice—at least, that is, in
terms of an obfuscation of self-understanding. This would delegitimize important forms of
cultural expression and linguistic practice, which is precisely the unjust dominant viewpoint that
Fricker herself emphatically criticizes.
As Rebecca Mason (2011), José Medina (2012), and Kristie Dotson (2012) all point out,
this exposes a blind spot in Fricker’s construal of hermeneutical injustice. Fricker appears to
ignore the possibility that while a marginalized group may be excluded from the dominant
hermeneutical resource, this does not entail that the group’s subjects lack self-understanding or
self-intelligibility from the perspective of their own culture’s hermeneutical resource:
[W]ith and through the development of new expressive and interpretive resources,
hermeneutically marginalized subjects can eventually achieve understanding of
their obscured experiences while they may still remain systematically
misunderstood by others (some others) when they try to communicate about those
experiences. In these cases the hermeneutical injustice continues even after the
lack of self-understanding disappears, which shows that the problem goes deeper
and concerns not only a deficient self-understanding, but also and more
fundamentally a precarious and unequal relation to expressive and interpretive
practices in which experiences are shared with others. (Medina 2012:207)
So as Medina explains above, being unable to participate within the dominant hermeneutical
framework does not preclude self-knowledge or intelligibility. But this exclusion does prevent
the successful performance of certain speech acts, particularly at the level of locution, because it
interferes with the requisite conditions of reciprocity in the speaker-hearer relationship. As
Hornsby explains:
“What reciprocity ensures is only that hearers are such as to recognize speaker’s
speech as it is meant to be taken. It ensures that in ordinary cases of linguistic
communication, there is something a speaker has done which both is overt (not
concealed by the speaker) and is transparent (not hidden from hearers)” (Hornsby
2003)
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The hearer, just as much as the speaker herself, needs to understand what the speaker is saying
(locution) and what the speaker is doing in saying it (illocution). When the hearer fails to
understand what the speaker says because he operates within a dominant linguistic framework,
while the speaker operates within a marginalized linguistic framework, this is still a case of
epistemic injustice in some sense even if the speaker does not lack self-understanding, as is
seemingly required in the case of hermeneutical injustice. So while Jeantel’s vocabulary and
grammar were in fact the internally consistent vocabulary and grammar of AAVE, that her
interlocutors in the courtroom were unable (or unwilling) to understand her demonstrates the
significance of the reciprocal speaker-hearer relationship in successful communication. Like
Hornsby, Kristie Dotson emphasizes the importance of the speaker-hearer relationship in
communication, explaining: “Speakers require audiences to ‘meet’ their effort ‘halfway’ in a
linguistic exchange” (2011:238). In cases like those of Jeantel, her audience, operating within a
dominant linguistic framework, proved unwilling to meet her communicative efforts halfway in
accommodating her linguistic diversity; that they did not demonstrates that racist attitudes
regarding the value and intelligibility of non-dominant dialects such as AAVE played a role in
their response to her testimony.
2.5 The Upshot of Locutionary Disablement
In sum: while Langton and Hornsby propose an account of silencing as illocutionary
disablement, it appears that in cases when one operates within a non-dominant hermeneutical
framework, silencing can occur even at the locutionary level: that is, the ability of members of
politically marginalized social groups is impeded to such an extent, that communication between
dominant and non-dominant groups can become nearly impossible. Remember that the ability to
perform locutionary act can be construed as the ability to say anything at all. In cases of language
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or dialect barriers, a speaker is unable to communicate a particular locution to a hearer because
the hearer simply does not understand the meaning of that utterance. The speaker, in effect, has
not communicated anything because the reciprocal relation between speaker and hearer does not
hold. In this sense, then, the speaker has been silenced in a way considered neither by Langton
and Hornsby (in that it is locutionary, as opposed to illocutionary), nor by Fricker (in that it
follows the a linguistic model of silencing, as opposed to just the epistemic model). Additionally,
while this silencing occurs within the realm of hermeneutical injustice, it is a different form of
hermeneutical injustice than the one Fricker has identified (or, as I will suggest, a different type
of epistemic injustice altogether).
There is nothing inherently unjust, however, in being unable to communicate a particular
locution. Language barriers impede communication all the time. It is only when this sort of
communicative dysfunction occurs as a result of unjust imbalances in social power that it
becomes problematic. When this is the case, we must look at the political and historical
circumstances that govern what language counts as “intelligible” to “collective” understanding.
Even what can be communicated at the locutionary level is a political matter, as different cultural
frameworks will dictate which locutions are deemed intelligible. Which frameworks come to
dominate is a historical, political, and, as we will see, philosophical issue, that bears on the
relation between individuals’ epistemic capacities and their humanity.

3. A Third Type of Epistemic Injustice
3.1 Interpretive Burdens
As I have just argued, it is not necessarily the case that one lacks self-understanding when
one is excluded from the dominant hermeneutical framework. But it is the case that the
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communication of meaningful locutions between groups can be greatly inhibited. So the harm of
silencing via locutionary disablement persists in many cases of hermeneutical injustice, although
the harm of the lack of self-understanding may not. Bridging the interpretive gap between a
marginalized framework and a dominant framework, then, requires effort on the part of the
dominant group of hearers to recognize the historical and philosophical precedent for devaluing
the speech and modes of expression of marginalized groups, and to deliberately push back
against this precedent—as deliberately as this precedent was established in the first place.
Unfortunately though, this interpretive burden usually falls upon the shoulders of marginalized
group. Rather than the dominant group reconsidering and actively reversing its prejudicial
attitudes toward the hermeneutical frameworks of marginalized groups and learning to interpret
frameworks different from their own, it is the marginalized group that must master navigating
through the dominant framework to make themselves understood, or risk dehumanization or
worse: “Often for their very survival, blacks have been forced to become lay anthropologists,
studying the strange culture, customs and mind-set of the ‘white tribe’ that has such frightening
power over them” (Mills 2007:17). That marginalized groups often must struggle to make
themselves understood in this way—not to themselves, but to the dominant power—suggests that
there may be a third type of epistemic injustice, beyond testimonial injustice and hermeneutical
injustice (though importantly related to features of both). In what follows, I will articulate this
distinct, third form of epistemic injustice—what I will call the epistemic injustice of interpretive
burden.
3.2 Structural Epistemic Ignorance
Recall Fricker’s definition of hermeneutical injustice: “Hermeneutical injustice is: the
injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective
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understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource”
(Fricker 2007:155). I propose that this third type of epistemic injustice occurs similarly when a
“significant area of one’s social experience [is] obscured.” But unlike hermeneutical injustice, it
is not the case that it is obscured from “collective understanding”—as what counts as
“collective” is itself a politically loaded question. Instead, such injustice occurs when a
“significant area of one’s social experience” is obscured specifically from the understanding of
the dominant group. Thus, this type of epistemic injustice goes hand in hand with epistemic
ignorance on the part of the dominant group.
As Linda Alcoff (2007) explains, this epistemic ignorance on the part of the dominant
group, along with practices of dehumanization, form a necessary condition for systematic
oppression to occur—for, it is thought, a dominant society that takes itself (through a sort of selfdeception) to be just surely would not engage in such practices as colonization and enslavement
in the first place. Alcoff summarizes this line of thought, which she attributes to Mills as the
structural argument, as follows:
1. One of the key features of oppressive societies is that they do not acknowledge
themselves as oppressive. Therefore, in any given oppressive society, there is a
dominant view about the general nature of the society that represents its particular
forms of inequality and exploitation as basically just and fair, or at least the best
of all possible worlds.
2. It is very likely, however, that this dominant representation of the unjust society
as a just society will have countervailing evidence on a daily basis that is at least
potentially visible to everyone in the society.
3. Therefore, cognitive norms of assessment will have to be maintained that allow
for this countervailing evidence to be regularly dismissed so that the dominant
view can be held stable. (2007:48)
Not only, then, does the dominant group have a vested interest in the privileging of their own
“cognitive norms of assessment”, but this actually requires a willful epistemic ignorance that can
only be achieved through deliberate practices of dehumanization.
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In what follows, I will illustrate—through reference to Mills’s The Racial Contract
(1997)—how the political system of white supremacy has operated in just this way to perpetrate
and perpetuate a significant hermeneutical injustice—particularly of the sort associated with
silencing as locutionary disablement—through the privileging of the white European
hermeneutical framework. In not recognizing certain hermeneutical frameworks as legitimate,
dominant groups perpetually deny the humanity of marginalized groups by denying their status
as knowers and speakers.
3.3 Silencing and Dehumanization
Returning briefly to Langton’s and Fricker’s respective accounts of silencing—though
they approach the issue of silencing from different philosophical areas—both agree that silencing
constitutes a harm with regard to its effect on the cognitive capacities that are constitutive of
one’s humanity. For Langton and Hornsby:
Possession of this capacity (which is to participate in illocution)—not just of the
ability to produce intelligible sounds and marks (which is to participate in
locution)—is necessary for any individual to flourish as a knowledgeable human
being, and for the spread of knowledge across populations and generations of
individuals. (1998:37)
And for Fricker: “To be wronged in one’s capacity as a knower is to be wronged in a capacity
essential to human value. When one is undermined or otherwise wronged in a capacity essential
to human value, one suffers an intrinsic injustice” (2007:44). Again, though, remember that
Fricker prefers the epistemic model “because it requires less erosion of women’s human status
before the silencing effect kicks in” (2007:142). However, it is this precise erosion of human
status (i.e., dehumanization) that characterizes many occurrences of silencing of marginalized
groups, especially when entire hermeneutical frameworks are deemed unintelligible by the
dominant power.
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Given this dehumanizing element of silencing, it will be helpful to explore how,
historically, hermeneutical injustices have arisen precisely through dehumanizing practices and
philosophical justifications. Further, an account of silencing as locutionary disablement
illustrates particularly well how both marginalized groups and their associated expressive and
linguistic practices are deliberately devalued to the point that such practices are barely registered
as language at all by the dominant group. A close look at The Racial Contract (1997), in
particular, will help draw out the ways in which willful epistemic ignorance on the part of the
dominant group works alongside dehumanizing practices in order to strip marginalized groups of
the legitimacy of their hermeneutical frameworks, and thus, silencing them via locutionary
disablement.
3.4 The Racial Contract and Epistemic Injustice
In The Racial Contract, Mills draws on social contract theory and argues that in addition
to the social contract, there has been an implicit (and oftentimes explicit) racial contract that has
historically existed (and still currently exists) alongside the social contract. The racial contract, in
fact, is far more real than any theoretical social contract, as it describes the actual history and
perpetuation of white dominance over non-white populations. Briefly: the racial contract, like the
social contract, describes the way in which society has been organized and attempts to justify its
formation and structure. However, while the racial contract does describe the way in which white
dominance became established over nonwhite populations, it does not actually endorse the
justification for this political arrangement; rather, “it does normative work for us not through its
own values, which are detestable, but by enabling us to understand the polity’s actual history and
how these values and concepts have functioned to rationalize oppression, so as to reform them”
(Mills 1997:6). Of course, while this paper does not engage with social contract theory, Mills’s
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account is significant in that he presents a particular history of domination, which vividly
illustrates not just the emergence of the racial contract, but also the emergence of systemic
epistemic injustice. Importantly, Mills focuses largely on the epistemic dimension of the racial
contract—that is, the epistemic norms and cognitive requirements that the signatories of the
contract must satisfy: “the Racial Contract [is] epistemological, prescribing norms for cognition
to which its signatories must adhere” (1997:11). This epistemological dimension of the racial
contract is just where epistemic injustices occur.
According to Mills, the racial contract contains a distinctly epistemic element in that it
restricts the possibility of knowledge to a subset of humans—in this case, White Europeans:
The epistemological dimension is the corollary of the preemptive restriction of
knowledge to European cognizers, which implies that in certain spaces real
knowledge (knowledge of science, universals) is not possible. Significant cultural
achievement, intellectual progress, is thus denied to these spaces, which are
deemed (failing European intervention), to be permanently locked into a cognitive
state of superstition and ignorance. (1997:44)
This denial of one’s capacity as a knower (to use Fricker’s terminology) was then used as
justification for the deliberate dehumanization of nonwhite populations. As Mills observes, this
dehumanization was quite literal and, indeed, systematic:
In the slavery contract […] the terms of the contract require of the slave an
ongoing self-negation of personhood, an acceptance of chattel status […] Thus, in
the Caribbean and on the mainland of the Americas, there were sites where newly
arrived Africans were sometimes taken to be ‘seasoned’ before being transported
to the plantations. And this was basically the metaphysical transforming them
from persons into subpersons of the chattel variety. (1997:84)
This literal dehumanization reflects Fricker’s notion of epistemic objectification in that a
speaker/potential knower is downgraded in his status from subject to mere source of information
(if that). Further, this process of dehumanization and objectification actually requires a great deal
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of conceptualization and reconceptualization of the requirements for personhood, on both the
part of the dominant white culture and subordinate nonwhite culture. Mills goes on:
This project requires labor at both ends, involving the development of a
depersonizing conceptual apparatus through which whites must learn to see
nonwhites and also, crucially, through which nonwhites must learn to see
themselves. For the nonwhites, then this is something like the intellectual
equivalent of the physical process of ‘seasoning,’ ‘slave breaking,’ the aim being
to produce an entity who accepts subpersonhood. (1997:87)
Crucially, Mills points out that under the auspices of ideal theory itself, nonwhites have been
systematically denied the cognitive status required to take part in such theorizing.7 And because
it has historically been whites who have set the framework and norms for conducting ideal
theory, nonwhites are not only left out of the conversation, but they are rendered unable to even
potentially participate in this new framework into which they have been unwillingly thrust. This
is because they lack the requisite conceptual framework and associated conceptual skills that
have been delineated by the dominant group of theorizers:
[C]oncepts are crucial to cognition: cognitive scientists point out that they help us
to categorize, learn, remember, infer, explain, problem-solve, generalize,
analogize. Correspondingly, the lack of appropriate concepts can hinder learning,
interfere with memory, block inferences, obstruct explanation, and perpetuate
problems.” (1997:6)
At first, this sounds strikingly like a paradigmatic case of hermeneutical injustice (like that of
sexual harassment) as originally construed by Fricker. That this system of white dominance over
nonwhites dictates the terms of that collective understanding means that those (nonwhites) who
have been deliberately and perpetually excluded might end up lacking the conceptual resources
to understand their own social experiences in terms of the dominant hermeneutical framework.
However, as I have argued earlier, this exclusion from the dominant framework need not
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While I do not intend to go into depth regarding the ideal vs. non-ideal theory debate in this paper, I mention Mills
position on it because his criticism of ideal theory is conceptually linked with his criticism of those objective stances
purportedly claimed to be taken up by dominant groups of theorizers.
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necessarily result in an obscuring of self-understanding. Further, this “lack of appropriate
concepts,” which “can hinder learning interfere with memory, block inferences, obstruct
explanation, and perpetuate problems” (Mills 1997:6) can affect those operating within the
dominant hermeneutical framework just as much as it can affect those operating within the
marginalized hermeneutical framework.
As we have seen (for instance, in the case of Rachel Jeantel), this lack of familiarity with
and willful ignorance of different hermeneutical frameworks certainly “perpetuates problems”
(to put it mildly!). Paradoxically though, as both Mills and Alcoff point out, this is usually to the
benefit of the dominant group and to the detriment of the marginalized group, demonstrating that
we are, in fact, dealing with injustice. Kristie Dotson identifies yet another type of epistemic
injustice associated with epistemic ignorance, which she calls contributory injustice. She writes:
“Contributory injustice is caused by an epistemic agent’s situated ignorance, in the form of
willful hermeneutical ignorance, in maintaining and utilizing structurally prejudiced
hermeneutical resources that result in epistemic harm to the epistemic agency of a knower”
(2012:31). My own articulation of a third type of epistemic injustice is similar to Dotson’s in that
it essentially involves epistemic ignorance on the part of the dominant group, but it extends to a
particular consequence of this ignorance, which arises in cases when the dominant group is
attempting to overcome its ignorance. Specifically, we end up dealing with the epistemic
injustice of interpretive burden, because even when genuine attempts to overcome epistemic
ignorance eradicate the first two types of epistemic injustice are made, communication between
groups can still be seriously impeded—and it is usually members of the marginalized group that
must struggle to make their language and concepts intelligible to the dominant group, rather than
the other way around.
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3.5 More Interpretive Burdens and ‘White Feminism’
Ironically, it is often the case that marginalized groups are subject to the interpretative
burden of making themselves understood to others—the third type of epistemic injustice that I
have identified—in the very attempts to ameliorate the former types of epistemic injustice. We
see this in the criticism of white feminists by feminists of color: the same problems of Whitedominated theory, as have been illustrated in The Racial Contract, are to a certain extent
repeated when the dominant group of feminist theorists (i.e., white) dictate the language and
conceptual framework of the theory. This leads to the exclusion of the voices —and thus, again,
silencing—of women of color. In many cases, the interpretive burden placed on women of color
is due to language barriers, such as the barrier between Spanish and English. As María Lugones
explains:
(In an Hispana voice)
[…]
We and you do not talk in the same language. When we talk to you we use your
language: the language of your experience and of your theories. We try to use it to
communicate our world of experience. But since your language and your theories
are inadequate in expressing our experiences, we only succeed in communicating
our experience of exclusion. We cannot talk to you in your language because you
do not understand it. So the brute facts that we understand your language and that
the place where most theorizing about women is taking place is your place, both
combine to require that we either use your language and distort our experience not
just in speaking about it, but in the living of it, or that we remain silent.
Complaining about exclusion is a way of remaining silent. (1983:575)
Though I remarked earlier that there is nothing inherently unjust in being unable to communicate
a particular locution due to language barriers, upon closer examination of the actual language
barriers that often impede valuable and constructive dialogue between feminists of different
backgrounds it becomes clear that not making an effort to understand another’s language
suggests epistemic ignorance on the part of the hearer—the same sort of epistemic ignorance
historically practiced by the dominant White power. Such ignorance subjects the speaker to this
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third form of epistemic injustice—the epistemic injustice of interpretive burden—whereby she
must struggle to make herself understood, even when white feminists sincerely seek to
understand the experiences of women of color.
The consequences of this reverberate beyond the realm of theory and into areas of lived
experience—for example, in the legal system, as we have seen with Rachel Jeantel. Even in a
setting in which communicating one’s experience (or rather, not being able to communicate
one’s experience) to others is essential for the carrying out of justice—i.e., in the courtroom—
there are both blatant and more subtle attempts to further silence marginalized groups. Perhaps,
given the history of white supremacy, it is unsurprising that epistemic injustice would persist in
these institutional and legal domains. As both Mills and Alcoff have explained, such institutions
were designed to perpetrate, and at the same time erase evidence of, injustice. Jeantel had to
struggle to make herself understood—a struggle that proved unsuccessful—but she did so in a
system that was never meant to understand her in the first place (that is, a system dominated by
White men).
However, what is perhaps more concerning than the continued willful epistemic
ignorance of dominant groups is that even those with good intentions, as in the case of feminists,
often continue to perpetrate epistemic injustice—particularly the epistemic injustice of
interpretive burden—in their theorizing. The voices and experiences of women of color are often
excluded—and thus, silenced—from narratives presented in mainstream, white-dominated
feminism. Though this problem has been largely acknowledged within third-wave feminism, and
more of an effort has been made to understand the distinct life experiences of those who occupy
various intersecting marginalized identities, again, this task generally falls upon the shoulders of
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women of color to teach and explain to white feminists the nature of their experiences of
oppression.
White feminists can be, and often are, caught up in the same practice of epistemic
ignorance that has persisted since the early days of the racial contract. Mariana Ortega explains:
“I emphasize the dangerous terrain white feminists traverse when they claim to be concerned
about women of color while at the same time being fully engaged in production of ignorance
about the lives of these women” (2006:48). Not only do white feminists claim to be concerned
about women of color, but in their attempts to practice a more inclusive and pluralistic feminism,
they often demand that women of color exhaust their own epistemic and emotional resources in
explaining their own oppression—a phenomenon that Nora Berenstain calls epistemic
exploitation (2016). It is clearly the case, then, that substantial changes need to be made to the
way feminist theory has historically been conducted. In the following section, I will gesture at
what sorts of approaches might contribute to a more just feminism, with an eye towards the
importance of reciprocity.
Because those engaged in such theory purportedly aim to dismantle the very oppressive
and unjust systems that lead to epistemic injustice in the first place, it is of the utmost importance
to the success of both their theoretical and practical efforts to take up a good share of the
interpretive burden unjustly imposed on women of color. This is a particularly deliberate task of
dismantling because, as we have seen, the historical circumstances by which such silencing arose
in the first place were themselves politically and philosophically deliberate—that is, making the
marginalized group’s hermeneutical framework unintelligible was part of the very process of
dehumanization and domination. It speaks to the insidious nature of this centuries-long history of
injustice that even those with the good intention of ending epistemic injustice risk reinforcing it.
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3.6 Reciprocity in Overcoming Ignorance and Injustice
The positive project for a truly inclusive and pluralistic feminism that avoids perpetrating
epistemic injustice of any type requires bridging the interpretive gap among groups of women
occupying various positions of social power, without unfairly burdening those who already face
the many types of epistemic injustice. However, bridging this gap does not mean totally
eradicating differences in order to achieve an even playing field upon which successful
communication may take place. But I do want to return to the notion of reciprocity, as articulated
earlier by Hornsby. Fundamentally, I want to emphasize the importance of reciprocity in
dialogue amongst feminists of various backgrounds. In this sense, I am in agreement with
Lugones and Spelman, who write, “Our suggestion in this paper, and at this time it is no more
than a suggestion, is that only when genuine and reciprocal dialogue takes place between
‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ can we trust the outsider’s account” (1983:577). However, like
Lugones and Spelman, I acknowledge that what this reciprocity might look like is itself a
complicated matter: “If white/Anglo women and women are color are to do theory jointly, in
helpful, respectful, illuminating and empowering ways, the task ahead of white/Anglo women
because of this asymmetry, is a very hard task. The task is a very complex one. In part, to make
an analogy, the task can be compared to learning a text without the aid of teachers” (1983:580).
But ultimately, Lugones and Spelman suggest:
[T]he motive of friendship remains as both the only appropriate and
understandable motive for white/Anglo feminists engaging in the task [of joint
theory], then you will be moved to attain the appropriate reciprocity of
understanding that will enable to you follow us in our experiences as we are able
to follow you in yours. (1983:581)
In a later paper, Lugones describes this practice of following one another in each other’s
experiences as “world travelling”:
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One can “travel” between […] “worlds” and one can inhabit more than one of
these “worlds” at the very same time. I think that most of us who are outside the
mainstream of, for example, the U.S. dominant construction or organization of
life are “world travellers” as a matter of necessity and of survival. It seems to me
that inhabiting more than one ‘world’ at the same time and ‘travelling’ between
“worlds” is part and parcel of our experience and situation. (Lugones 1987:10-11)
As Lugones notes, “world travelling” is often a necessity for women of color, but she promotes it
as a practice that women of all backgrounds ought to undertake in a loving manner. The question
remains how White feminists are to travel to the worlds of women of color without repeating
unjust imperialistic practices. Though I admit I have no concrete suggestions at this time, I
maintain that reciprocity is indeed the goal (in both the narrower linguistic sense and the broader
ethical sense), so that silencing of all types that we have considered here will be avoided.

Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to show how silencing, as locutionary disablement, can
arise in cases of hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, I highlighted a criticism of Fricker’s
account of hermeneutical injustice—that is, the problematic notion that exclusion from the
dominant hermeneutical framework harms an individual by obscuring self-understanding. It is
the case that, as a matter of historical, political, and philosophical practice—as we see in the case
of the white supremacy as illustrated in The Racial Contract—groups have been deliberately and
perpetually excluded from the dominant hermeneutical framework. These marginalized groups
are certainly victims of hermeneutical injustice, because they have been excluded and
dehumanized in this epistemic manner; but they do not necessarily suffer from a lack of selfunderstanding, because they have their own hermeneutical frameworks within which they
operate. That these frameworks are not generally recognized as legitimate or intelligible by the
dominant power leads to the marginalized groups’ being locutionarily disabled from

29

participating in communication across groups and as such, these marginalized groups are
subjected to a third type of epistemic injustice—the epistemic injustice of interpretive burden—
in their struggle to make themselves understood.
In order to confront, and hopefully eliminate such injustice, deliberate efforts must be
made on the part of the dominant group to bridge the interpretive gap between hermeneutical
frameworks—perhaps efforts aimed at something like the notion of world-traveling—or
“knowing the other’s ‘world’”—as suggested by Lugones: “Without knowing the other’s
‘world,’ one does not know the other, and without knowing the other one is really alone in the
other’s presence because the other is only dimly present to one” (1987:18). Knowing the other is
essential, because what is at stake in epistemic injustice is one’s very humanity in their capacity
as a knower.
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